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BULLETIN No. 8319

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ENEMY DOCUMENTS

CDEC Doc Log No.	Summary	Capture Data
12-1383-67 (12 page original handwrittdn)  (B)	<p>(U) Results of Allied Arty Shellings and B52 bombings in Bả Biên Prov, MR 1.</p> <p>(C) Item #1: Letter, dated 2 Aug [year U/I], from Lê Cang of HT [LBN] 109/3.175H addressed to Nam of Biên Hòa [Prov, MR 1], reveals that Cang had been informed of the destruction, by an enemy [Allied] arty shelling, of an underground shelter for the personnel of the [Biên Hòa] Prov Party Committee Radio Station. Three members in the shelter were killed. One victim was recognized as being Hai Nhieu's son while the names of two others were still unknown.</p> <p>Therefore, Cang requests addresses to inform him of the fate of Comrade Trần who could have been in the shelter while it collapsed.</p> <p>(C) Item #2: Letter, dated 23 Aug 67, from Trảng of HT 60.759 VT, addressed to his nephew An [unit U/I] reveals that Trảng was nearly buried alive when his underground shelter collapsed due to B52 bombing. All his belongings, as well as the radio-set therein, were completely destroyed.</p> <p>Addressee was further informed that Tâm, one of his relatives, was in training at School 29, T1.</p> <p>The author stated that victory was approaching [for VC].</p> <p>(C) Item #3: Mess Account settlement, dated 8 Sep 67, signed by Manh [rank and unit unk], reveals that Manh received 5,520\$ from an U/I agency for the accommodation of the patients of elements C11, C12, C13, C17 and D Command Committee [prob 11th Co, 12th Co, 13th Co, 14th Co, 17th Co and Bn Hq, subordination U/I] as follows:</p> <p>C11: PVT Nguyễn Văn Chi, Nguyễn Văn Tôn, Lê Văn Mân and Phan Văn Phước.</p> <p>C12: Sqd Ldr Lê Văn Thọ and Asst Sqd Ldr Nguyễn Văn Đông.</p> <p>C13: Asst Sqd Ldr Đinh Văn Chiên; PVT Nguyễn Văn Bôn and Nguyễn Hữu Quảng.</p> <p>C14: Sqd Ldr Nguyễn Văn Dền.</p>	<p>21 Nov 67 YS245878 LRRP, 9th U S Inf Div Received CDEC: 5 Dec 67</p>

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<p>12-1384-67 (13 page original handwritten)</p> <p>(B)</p>	<p>C17: Sqd Ldr Dương Văn Mãnh; Asst Sqd Ldr Hòa Hồng Bang, and Thông. D Hq: Asst Plat Ldr Võ Văn Hải, and Hải Hùng [ position U/I ].</p> <p>(C) Item #4: Notebook with entries dated between 21 Aug and 16 Sep 67, maintained by a member of an U/I unit, reveals the following information:</p> <p>- An amount of 6,860\$ was issued as additional subsistence allowances to 15 patients whose names are cited in Item #3. Moreover, the position of Hải Hùng of Bn Hq and that of Cao Văn Thông of C17 are disclosed: Hải Hùng was [Bn] Co while Thông was Adjutant.</p> <p>Subsequent entry shows that 1,400\$ was issued to Trần Lũ for the accommodation of 28 recruits.</p> <p>Last entries are two receipts, dated 16 Sep 67, signed by Lê Phước Nghĩa, Adjutant of D3 [ prob 3d Bn ], revealing that Nghĩa received 15,680\$ from an U/I agency and 960\$ from C17.</p> <p>(U) CDEC COMMENT: No Further Significant Information.</p> <p>Hồ Chí Minh's Order For Implementation of General Counter Offensive and General Uprising During 1967 Winter and 1968 Spring And Summer.</p> <p>(C) Personal notebook, entries dated from 5 Nov 67 through 12 Nov 67, maintained by Vũ Sinh Viên, contains notes taken from news bulletins and Party activities of his unit. Of significance is the entry on 12 Nov 67 which records notes taken probably from a meeting held to "disseminate the order for the General Counter Offensive and General Uprising".</p> <p>Document states that the Central Headquarters [Prob NVN Politburo] met recently to [further] analyze the 13th Resolution and concluded that "the time for a direct revolution has come and that the opportunity for a general counter offensive and general uprising is within reach". Therefore, "the Central Party Committee and Uncle [ Hồ Chí Minh ] have ordered the [Lao-Dong] Party Committee, in South Vietnam and the entire army and population of South Vietnam to implement a general counter offensive and general uprising in order to achieve a decisive victory for the [ VC ] revolution within the [ 1967 ] Winter and 1968 Spring And Summer".</p> <p>Document suggests that such a decision was based on the following assessments of Allied and VC/NVA situation:</p> <p>1. Allied Situation: Document states that the enemy [Allies] has completely failed in their efforts to pacify rural areas and to destroy [VC/NVA] main force units.</p>	<p>7.</p> <p>19 Nov 67 AT987227 B/2/327, 1/101st US Abn Div Received CDEC: 6 Dec 67</p>

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	<p>The US war escalation against NVN also failed. The Allies only attained 5% of their pacification program goals, in Binh Dinh, Phu Yen and Gialai <u>[Pleiku Prov]</u>. 80% of the population in Phu Yen Prov have been liberated <u>[by VC/NVA]</u>. Meanwhile the US's expenditures in SVN have become three times higher than those for the Korean war. Americans were told by the French that it took the Americans twenty years to lose a war which only took the French ten years. The anti-war movements in the United States also reached their apex and really confused American leaders. <u>[President]</u> Johnson is presently very confused and demoralized. <u>[Secretary]</u> McNamara demanded that he end bombings of NVN, arguing that such activities are fruitless and only harden the NVN <u>[Government]</u>. McNamara also complains that the SVN war has driven the American people into many crises and hardships, and that no results were obtained <u>[from the SVN war]</u>, even though six divisions and three brigades were sent to SVN. Meanwhile, the Americans continue to fail in SVN. In regard to the "Puppet" Government, even though a president and vice-president have been "created", serious contradictions between civilian and military leaders continue to exist in spite of US-reconciliation efforts. This situation will worsen due to the continued purges which take place in the <u>[GVN]</u> internal organization. In sum, the Americans are presently deadlocked and unable to find a solution for the SVN war.</p> <p>2. <u>VC/NVA Situation</u>: "We" <u>[VC/NVA]</u> continue to be on the offensive after achieving continuous victories in the past. The situation in Gia Lai <u>[Pleiku Prov]</u> promises many favorable developments this year. In Phu Yen, the recent difficulties are gone, and 80% of the local population have been liberated. "Our" <u>[VC/NVA]</u> main troops now operate in the lowlands. The "enemy" <u>[Allies]</u> is on the defensive. He has abandoned 70 strong points in Quang Nam, ten in Binh Dinh. The <u>[VC]</u> political movements become stronger in all areas and are "just ready" <u>[possibly for uprisings]</u>. Many successes were obtained by the coordination of political activities with military activities conducted in towns and cities, such as in Loc Ninh and Ben Tre. We <u>[VC]</u> now control many streets in Saigon.</p> <p>In regard to future activities of Region 5, document states that the "Region 5 Party Committee and Military Affairs Party Committee of MR 5 promised the <u>[Lao Dong]</u> Party to completely liberate Region 5 during the 1967-1968 Winter-Spring Campaign". The methods to be used are: "Use very strong military attacks" in coordination with the uprising of local population to take over towns and cities. <u>VC/NVA "troops will flood the lowlands. They will move toward liberating capitals to take over power by brigade(s) and regiment(s)".</u></p> <p>The document also suggests that the above subject</p>	

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be widely disseminated to VC cadre, troops, local population and to RVNAF Officers and enlisted personnel, via leaflets. However, nothing should be said about the origin of the order for implementation of general counter and general uprising. In this aspect, the document reads: "tell our brothers not to say that this order comes from the Party and Uncle Hồ Chí Minh, but to say that it comes from the Liberation Front. Also, do not specify time for implementation".

(C) CDEC COMMENT:

(U) 1. No Further Significant Information.

(U) 2. The underlined portions are Full Translation

(C) 3. Correlation with other documents captured under the same circumstances indicates that Vũ Sinh Viên is the Political Officer of C134 aka 82mm Mortar Co of Công Trường 22 aka 22d Regt, 3d NVA Div.

*for Robert B. Parenti*  
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